

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

(From the *Times*, 21st February.)
ALTHOUGH the news that Prussia would be excluded from the conference is confirmed by the official list of the plenipotentiaries given in the *Moniteur*, intrigues on behalf of Prussia are still going on, and the *Pays* says that, in case of any change in the present situation, the Prussian representatives would be M. d'Aveghem, who sat in the Dresden conference of 1851, and M. de Savigny, the Prussian minister at Karlsruhe. To complete the programme it is added that M. Balan, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, would accompany the plenipotentiaries.

The *Siecle* has an article which throws a new light on the question of the admission of Prussia and the German States to the Paris conference. "Diplomatic notes," says the writer, "are not always explicit. Does that of the *Moniteur* mean to say that the preliminaries having been signed by the allies of December 2, the other powers interested in the general proposition to be made under Article 2 will be called in afterwards? It is not for us to dive into the secrets of governments, and therefore we shall content ourselves with registering the fact, that the preliminaries of peace will be discussed only by Russia and the parties to the treaty of December 2, and up to that time Prussia is not to be admitted to the conference. We approve of this exclusion, which we have all along called for; but, naturally when European interests shall come in question, Prussia and several other powers will be invited to take part in the general negotiation. It cannot be dissimulated that upon the acceptance of the preliminaries will depend the question of peace, for in these first conferences the general bases will be proposed and discussed. We must then wait patiently for the result, not forgetting that pursuant to the will expressed by the governments of France and England, the preparations are not to be interrupted. At all events we ought to give the *Moniteur* credit for having, by its reserved attitude on this occasion, given a lesson to those who, with so much fracas, have proclaimed a peace, the preliminaries of which are as yet unknown."

The *Nord* publishes the following telegraphic despatch, dated from Vienna, February 2:— "When signing the protocol yesterday, Prince Gortschakoff requested that Prussia should be invited to take part in the conference. Count Buol supported the request. The French and English Ministers took notice of it, *ad referendum*."

The Prussian government organ the *Zeit*, of the 9th of February, says—"It is still uncertain whether Prussia will or will not take part in the conference which are to open at Paris on the 21st of this month. Prussia hesitates to accept the five propositions, with all the obligations they entail, lest she should become bound by them in case of the failure of negotiations. At the same time it is certain that no peace will be finally concluded to which Prussia is not a party." A despatch from Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim, dated the 3rd of February, intimates, however, that Prussia is ready to adopt the basis of negotiations; and to adopt it in a manner that "will not admit of any further adjournment or compromise, by signing the preliminaries, and by participating in the negotiations connected therewith, if invited thereto by the Powers interested." Prussia will therefore support Austria at Frankfurt; and she presumes that her German allies are also ready to adopt the basis.

The Marquis de Moustier, the French ambassador at Berlin, has arrived in Paris, on a visit for some days. This visit is probably not unconnected with the intrigues which are still going on to obtain admission for Prussia to the Congress.

The *Abbe du Nord*, hitherto distinguished by its ultra-war articles, has the following in its number for January 26th:—"A number of peace has appeared in the horizon, and has been saluted by all the friends of civilisation—by all who desire to see industry prosper in each of its branches. In the two years' war with four Powers the Russian people has exhibited in a remarkable manner its great and noble character, and has thus attracted the respect of its enemies."

"In all that concerns France, we may confidently affirm that the French nation loves and esteems the Russians, admires their courage and self-denial, and shows its sympathy on every occasion, as well in a short truce in the Crimea as in the passage of Russian prisoners through France. The French prisoners, on their part, are treated by the Russians as true brothers."

"God give us peace! but if He do not, Russia has always a sufficient means of resistance at her disposal to energetically repel her enemies. We hope, at all events, that the Russian fabrics and manufactures will take such an impetus with the re-establishment of peace as will completely emancipate the Russian commerce from foreigners."

"Every strong Power, even during peace, ought to be ready for war, Russia desires peace—but she has no fear of war."

We gather from different quarters the state of feeling and opinion in Germany concerning the approaching Congress. The States of Central Germany claim to be represented; and the Petty States of the Confederation unite with Prussia against the adoption of the propositions of Austria and the Western Powers.

A letter from Vienna of the 31st January, in the *Bourse Gazette*, says:—"I mentioned yesterday that Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, and the Princes of Thuringen, are of the same opinion as the Great German Powers with respect to the proposition which is to be submitted to the Diet. I learn to-day that this unanimity only refers to the proposition itself, and not to its contents. With respect to the latter, there exists between Prussia and Austria some difference of view which are important."

A letter from Berlin of the 1st of February, in the *Cologne Gazette*, says:—"We learn from a good source that the Western Powers have an intention of crowning the work of the Paris Congress by a commercial treaty with Russia, in which the latter is to modify her customs tariff in favour of those Powers. We presume that such a modification cannot take place without advancing the interests of Germany. It is, however, satisfactory to see the Western Powers proceeding by this occasion to open a breach in the prohibitive system of Russia."

A letter from Berlin of the 30th of January, in the *Westphalian Gazette*, says:—"A report has long been current, and has now acquired a certain degree of consistency, to the effect that England wishes that in the future treaty of peace the Russo-Swedish frontier shall be defined. It is possible that the integrity of Sweden will be guaranteed in the same manner that it has lately been by France and England, and the principal points of the treaty of November will be embodied in the European arrangement which is to be concluded at Paris."

It has been stated in the Austrian papers that an armistice was agreed upon at the time the

protocol was signed. But this is erroneous. The preliminaries of peace must be first discussed and signed at Paris, and when that is done, the subject of an armistice will next come under consideration.

The following are the plenipotentiaries who have been charged by their respective Governments to take part in the Congress:—

France—M. M. de Walewski and de Bourqueney.

England—Lord Clarendon and Cowley.

Austria—M. de Buol and Hubner.

Turkey—Ali Pacha and Mehmed Djemil Bey.

Piedmont—Count Cavour and the Marquis de Villamarina.

Russia—MM. d'Orloff and Brunow.

The envoys for the Congress will be lodged at the respective embassies. The Russian plenipotentiaries will occupy the Russian embassy, Lord Clarendon has hired a magnificent hotel in the Champs Elysees.

The *Constitutionnel* has an article which indicates that indemnification for the expenses of the war will not be one of the points of the stipulations included in the fifth point. It points out the increased commercial developments of France and England in the East as compensation for the sacrifices of the war.

From St. Petersburg we learn that since the acceptance of the propositions, Count Esterhazy has been the lion of the capital. Lately the Emperor passed in review the reserve of the guard and all the artillery, and was received with enthusiastic acclamations. That reception was entirely owing, it is said, to his late decision, and his popularity amongst the inhabitants of St. Petersburg is described as being unbounded for the same cause.

The Austrian communication on the subject of the Five Points accepted by Russia was presented to the Diet of Frankfurt on the 7th of February, and was referred to the respective committees without discussion.

It is stated that Russia has declared that the participation of Prussia in the Conference is a special question, entirely independent of the signature of the preliminaries of peace, and the solution of which may take place at a later period in the course of the Conference.

The following members of the proposed Peace Congress have arrived at Paris:—The Earl of Clarendon and Lord Cowley, M. de Bourqueney, Count Buol, Count Cavour, and Count Orloff and Baron Brunow. Ali Pacha, who left Constantinople on the 13th of February, is expected to reach Paris to-morrow the 22nd. Count Walewski, as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sovereign in whose capital the conference are held, will preside. It is not yet decided when the Congress is to meet, but next Saturday the 23rd, is now mentioned as the day on which it is to assemble.

On the 16th February Baron Brunow and M. de Cavour were received by M. Walewski at the Hotel of Foreign Affairs.

The Earl of Clarendon had a private audience with the Emperor of the French on the 17th February.

The gentlemen forming Lord Clarendon's official staff are:—The Hon. Mr. Spencer Ponsonby (his lordship's private secretary), Hon. Mr. Spring Rice, Mr. John Bidwell, Hon. Mr. Vivian, and Mr. Villiers Lister. Lord Cowley's staff consists of the gentlemen of the embassy, viz., Hon. Mr. Howard (chief secretary of legation), Mr. Stewart, Mr. Petre, Mr. Lytton, Mr. Earle, Mr. French, Mr. Ford, and his lordship's private secretary, Mr. Attie.

The Paris correspondent of the *Independence Belge* says:—"Russia concedes the non-recognition of Bismarck, but desires the neutralisation of the Isle of Heligoland, and wishes, in order to avoid their destruction, that the works on the north side of Sebastopol be considered as a land fort, the complete ruin of the south side of the city having removed all that affects its maritime character. As to Nicolaieff, Russia, it is said, does not expect that the suppression of this important dockyard (which can be devoted to the more exclusively to merchant vessels, since it was at Sebastopol that the vessels hitherto were armed) will be insisted upon. Nicolaieff can no more be considered as belonging to the coast of the Black Sea, than Rouen, in France, to that of the ocean. Besides, the consuls of the maritime powers would be able to ensure a rigorous observance of the treaty."

The *National Gazette* of Berlin says that it has received from a good authority the news that the German Diet, in its sitting of February 14, came to a decision on the Austrian proposition. The diet adopts the propositions as the basis of a solid and durable peace, and declares itself willing to undertake to maintain them. At the same time the Diet reserves to itself the right to pronounce on the as yet undeveloped stipulations of the fifth point.

Home News Office, Thursday Morning, February 21, 10 a.m.

The *Moniteur* of February 19, contains the following announcement:—

The Emperor received, on the 18th of February, several of the plenipotentiaries to the Conference which are about to be opened at Paris.

His Excellency the Count von Buol-Schauenstein, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria's Household; his Excellency the Count de Cavour, President of the Council of Ministers, and Minister of the Finances of his Majesty the King of Sardinia; and his Excellency the Baron de Brunow, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias—were introduced successively to the Emperor by his Excellency the Grand Master of the Ceremonies. Count Buol was presented by Baron von Hubner, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty; Count Cavour by the Marquis de Villamarina, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Sardinian Majesty; and Baron de Brunow by his Excellency the Grand Master of the Ceremonies.

His Excellency the Count Walewski, Minister Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs, assisted at these presentations. Ali Pacha was expected to arrive at Marseilles on February 19; should he arrive in Paris on February 22, the Conference will probably open on the following day—if not, on February 25. In the evening of the opening day there will be a grand concert at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The *Pays* suggests that it may perhaps not be thought essential to require from Russia such an extreme measure as the destruction of Nicolaieff, and that it would suffice to interdict Russia from building in the arsenal of Nicolaieff any ship, frigate, or vessel of war of any kind. The *Pays* also hints that the payment to Turkey of the expenses of the war may be compounded for by a "rectification" of the Asiatic frontier.

The *Debats*, in an article worthy of very serious consideration, shadows forth some of the points which are likely to form a subject of

great difficulty in the coming Conference. Three points in particular, the *Debats* learns from its German correspondents, occupy at this moment the special attention of statesmen at Berlin and Vienna. The first and most important of these is whether or not Nicolaieff is to be destroyed. Turkey will assuredly insist upon its destruction, and Russia will as certainly resist the proposition; the question is of immense moment in regard to the probable issue of the negotiations, because it forms no part of the vague fifth point, upon which discussion might have been expected to arise, but involves the interpretation of the third point, and hitherto all the peace organs, and the *Debats* foremost among them, have taken it for granted that the first four points were accepted "purely and simply" by Russia, and that no serious difference of opinion could arise upon them.

Under the head of Article 4, the *Debats* says that England will propose that Russia shall not be allowed to restore Bismarck nor to fortify what has been done at Sebastopol and Vienna, that she has made up her mind to this concession. But, if this be true, the negotiations are more likely to be broken up than to succeed. Russia intends to refuse to restore Kara to Turkey. Not that she has any idea of permanently keeping her conquest in Asia Minor—no, of course not—but the Conference is to be reminded that, by a despatch of Count Nesselrode addressed to Prince Gortschakoff, at the beginning of January, it was proposed to exchange Kara, and the other places taken by the allies, for the forts in the Crimea occupied by the allies. That proposition was refused, and now it will be said that Russia cannot be expected to renounce any of the fruits of her victories without compensation, and that the five points do not provide any for Kara. The third point of anticipated difficulty is a war indemnity to Turkey, which the *Debats* gives out as Russia's refusal to pay. Notwithstanding all this, the *Debats* concludes by expressing a firm belief that peace will be made.

SEBASTOPOL IRRETRIEVABLY DESTROYED.

(From the *Times* 18th February.)

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch brings tidings of the destruction of Fort St. Nicholas by the French army in the Crimea. Sir W. Codrington had before communicated that the demolition of that fort was complete. It may be said, then, that Sebastopol exists no longer as a naval stronghold. Sixteen months after the first shell was thrown against the place the only remaining fort has become a mass of ruins. A large barracks, capable of containing three Russian regiments, will no doubt be destroyed also. Every building that the siege has spared is now in the hands of the allies, and they will probably not quit the shores of the Crimea without having rendered useless whatever might serve as a shelter for the armaments of the enemy. We may now, in truth, look on the great work of the campaign as concluded. The destruction of Sebastopol, and not the conquest of the Crimea, was the object proposed by those who originated the bold enterprise of 1854. If the impulses of the Western nations rather than the policy of their rulers led to the war, which we may now perhaps consider at an end, it is equally true that the general feeling indicated Sebastopol as the point of attack. Even before the first blow was struck at Oltenitz, the name of the Crimean fortress was in the mouths of all who ventured to advise or predict on the subject of the war. At first, indeed, there seemed but little chance of a speedy combat in such closed lists. The Russian armies held the rich provinces of the Danube. Before them was a broad river, which an army assailing from the south must rashly place in its rear. Their flank was covered on one side by a delta, armed with first-class fortresses, on the other by the territory of a Power supposed to be friendly through a similarity of institutions and great benefits recently conferred. The Russian generals had even crossed the Lower Danube and seized the best positions in the Dobruddza, from which it would have been difficult to dislodge them. So great was the credit of the Russian arms, so exaggerated the estimate of Russian numbers and resolution, that the defence of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus was among the first plans of the Western tacticians. But there were causes fated soon to overthrow this mighty prestige. Perhaps, chief among them were that destruction of life and exhaustion of resources of which we know so little. What may have been passing behind the iron barrier of Russian isolation we can only judge by the results. The bravery of the Turks and the jealousy of the befriended, but insulted Austria added to the difficulties of the Czar, and the soil of Turkey was at length abandoned. Hardly was this great victory gained when the minds of our people reverted to Sebastopol. With much justice, they attributed the success of Russia in former wars to her uncontested naval power in the Black Sea. She could dictate the peace of Adrianople, she could confiscate and govern Georgia, she could wrest Asiatic Pashalics from the Sultan, she could rule the petty Court of Greece, and guide the animosities of the Rayahs, chiefly because from a commodious and impregnable centre she could send out a powerful squadron against any point of a weak rival's undefended coast. Sebastopol was a stronghold, on a peninsula that jutted far into the Euxine, beyond the shoal waters of the coast, beyond the limit where the sea is yearly frozen. It lay opposite Constantinople.

The prevailing winds would within two days bear even a sailing fleet to the Bosphorus; and not only wind, but steam, was brought into the service of Russia's magnificent ambition. What a Russian fleet could do, what it would dare to do, had been shown at Sinope. Turkey's naval forces were monthly becoming less, and the faintest trace of rivalry, it was evident, must soon be at an end. In these circumstances the British people called for a blow at Russian naval power, rejoiced at the enterprise that was set on foot, and for a year of alternate victory and disaster never belied their character for tenacity of purpose.

The victory is now won, the object is attained fully, and we trust for ever. Although it may be folly to depreciate a result, because its effects may not be eternal, yet it is certainly more gratifying to feel that success cannot soon be nullified. The Allies have not only destroyed Sebastopol, but to a great extent the possibility of restoring it. Seventy years have elapsed since the conquest of the Crimea, and little less than the old Tartar village of Akhtiar gave place to the first buildings of a new city, baptised with a pretentious name, but destined to a period of sombre and ominous grandeur, and then to a terrible fall. During the lives of two generations, that stronghold, where all is colossal, and built as if for ages, has been the care of a succession of sovereigns. The description given of the docks will tell how much time, labour, and treasure has been expended on the fleet which is now ingulfed beneath the waters of the harbour. It is said that the foundations, laid twelve feet

below the surface of the earth, have all been broken up by the successive explosions. Although it may be that anything that engineers have done engineers may undo, yet many years of constant toil and burdensome expense will hardly restore those great basins to the condition in which their constructors left them. The great forts were equally proofs of skill, grand design, and unvarying perseverance. Those on the southern side are now in ruins. Two were blown up by the Russians themselves on the morning of their retreat; now Fort St. Nicholas exists no longer. The destruction of the city seems hardly an event for modern times. It recalls the histories of antiquity, with their long deadly wars of commonwealth with commonwealth; it suggests ideas of doomed races, whose fall has been foretold by prophets inspired from on high. But even the ruin of Nineveh or Babylon, Carthage, or Jerusalem, did not represent a more utter vanishing of dominion than what has been done at Sebastopol does as regards the destruction of Russian supremacy in the East.

The navy of the Czar is gone, and cannot be reconstructed. All that remains of it is a few vessels sunk within the port. We should be glad to learn that some means had been found to destroy even these, and that no vestige of the once dreaded fleet remained whole below the waves. We may, however, now pause, satisfied with our labours. We may appreciate what we have gained by considering what but a short time since we should have been content with. While the siege was in progress, even those most exacting urged at first the opening of the Black Sea to the war vessels of every nation. It was demanded that the old policy of Turkey should be discarded, and that England and France should freely send their fleets under the palace windows of the Sultan, past the forts of the Bosphorus, into the neighbourhood of the Russian harbours. The Russian Admirals in turn would have been at liberty to pass at will into the Mediterranean. It was even thought fit that ports on the Black Sea coast should be granted to the allies, in order that a balance might be established. Later, our statesmen went further, and demanded the limitation of the Czar's armaments. Even then Turkey would have had to keep up squadrons at a great expense, and provide men for a service for which her population is unfitted and from which it instinctively shrinks. How much more has been now gained! The Straits may be closed, for there is no danger within. Turkey may spend her money more profitably, than in line of battle ships, for there is no enemy for them to oppose. Constantinople need not be subjected to any future invasion must be conducted entirely by land, for no navy will protect the Russian transports which supply armies in Bulgaria or below the Caucasus. With the forts and docks of Sebastopol ends the dream of a new conquest by the barbarians.

LORD CARDIGAN'S DEFENCE.

The following (says the *Times* of 20th February) is Lord Cardigan's statement in reply to the charges brought against him in the Report of the Crimean Commission:—

THE EARL OF CARDIGAN TO LORD PANMURE.

Portman-square, February 13, 1856.

My Lord,—In consequence of the allusions which have been made to me in the report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into matters connected with the British Army in the Crimea, I consider it my duty to address to your Lordship, as Secretary of State for War, an explanation of my conduct as therein animadverted upon.

The reflections upon me are conveyed in these words:— "When the supply began to fail the Commissariat officer referred to, who appears to have done everything in his power to meet the difficulties of the case, proposed, as he knew there was plenty of barley at Balaklava, that if a detachment of the Cavalry were allowed to go down daily, he would engage to bring up enough for the rest of the brigade. This proposition appears to have been brought specially under the notice of Lord Cardigan by Lieutenant-Colonel Mayow, Assistant Quartermaster-General of Cavalry, who states that his Lordship declined to accede to it, as he had previously done when a similar proposition was made to him to send the horses down for hay before that supply failed."

I will now, my Lord, proceed to show upon what evidence it is that this statement is made with regard to my conduct.

I will commence by stating that the 14th of November is the earliest date referred to in these accusations, and that I resigned the command of the Light Cavalry Brigade, owing to extreme bad health, on the 28th of the same month. I beg to transmit a copy of my official resignation.

The following is an extract from Lieutenant-Colonel Mayow's evidence, then Brigade-Major of the Light Cavalry Brigade:—

For some time after the 11th of November no hay was supplied to the brigade, but a full ration of barley. After some days the issue of barley fell off in quantity, but no hay. The men had to be sent to the Commissariat officer applied to Lord Cardigan to have the troop horses sent down for forage. When that application was first made the brigade was receiving full rations of barley, and he understood from the Commissariat officer that no hay could be got at Balaklava. It did not, therefore, appear to him at that time that it was expedient to send the troop horses. When the ration of barley fell off the application to send the horses for forage was renewed by the Commissariat officer, and brought by him (Colonel Mayow) under the notice of Lord Cardigan; but his Lordship declined to send them, and he did not see so long as the regiment remained in front.

I beg here to observe that Colonel Mayow does not state what the exact date was of his change of opinion as to the expediency or inexpediency of sending down the troop horses for forage. But I must consider it of great importance, when evidence is given four months after events have occurred, and that evidence reflects upon the conduct of an absent commanding officer, that dates should be accurately adhered to; and the necessity for this is particularly demonstrated by the inaccuracy of Lieut.-Colonel Douglas's evidence as to dates. Before I state in detail that officer's evidence, it is right I should point out that I have Colonel Mayow's own official reports to me up to the 20th, 21st, and 22nd November; and on the 20th, he reports:—

"The troops have a supply of barley, not quite the full amount; there is no hay."

On the 21st he reports:—"The horses got barley last night, not quite the full quantity, but no hay. The men had their rations."

And on the 22nd November:—"There was as near as possible a full ration of barley came up last night, but no hay. The men are well off for rations."

On November 18th Colonel Mayow previously made the following report:—"The horses had hay and corn yesterday, but not their full allowance; by some mistake the Artillery got some intended for us. I had spoken to Mr. Crook, who is now gone to Balaklava, and he said he hoped to be able to supply full rations this evening."

I send your Lordship Colonel Mayow's official reports to me, that you may see that my statement is correct; and I beg to point out to you that the full ration of barley was all the cavalry

horses got daily, except for short periods, since they landed in the East; there was very little hay in Bulgaria, and the only substitute for it, viz., chopped straw—was supplied with great uncertainty.

Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, in his evidence, states as follows:—

"For about a fortnight after the 14th of November the horses were without hay or straw, and had only on an average 2½ lbs. of barley per day."

While these were in this state I made a representation to the officer commanding the Light Brigade, through the Brigade-Major, proposing that a certain number of the horses should be sent down daily to bring up forage from Balaklava, where it was understood that it could be obtained; but the proposal was rejected."

This statement is supported in Appendix, page 19, by a letter dated Balaklava, December 3, 1854, four days after I had resigned the command of the Light Brigade, and dated from the camp near Balaklava, and not from that on the heights of Inkerman.

Balaklava, Dec. 3, 1854.

Sir,—I have the honour to report that the 11th Hussars, under my command, have only received the quantity of barley specified in the margin from the 28th of November to the 1st of December, 1854 (both days inclusive), and no hay.

I have, &c., J. DOUGLAS, Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding 11th Hussars.

I beg to state that I could have furnished some additional information to the board, and I do so now for your Lordship's perusal, viz., a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, of the 28th of November, 1854, the evening before I resigned the command of the brigade, in which, although the great deficiency of forage is complained of, not one word is said in the way of recommending that troop horses should be sent for the forage.

I beg leave to direct your attention to the manner in which this evidence is given, viz.:—"For about a fortnight after the 14th of November the horses were without hay or straw, and had only on an average 2½ pounds of barley per day;" whereas the Commissariat reports sent to me daily by Colonel Mayow go to prove that very nearly full rations were issued on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd of the month; and Colonel Mayow himself states in evidence that for some time after the 14th of November full rations of barley were supplied.

Colonel Shewell states that he learnt from Colonel de Salis, then in command of the regiment, that "towards the end of November, a representation was made to Lord Cardigan of the expediency of sending down a certain number of horses to Balaklava to procure forage, but his proposal was rejected."

I have already pointed out the nature of the representation made to me by Colonel Douglas, and in addition I have to state that the Commissariat officer of the brigade proposed verbally to Colonel Mayow, for my information, on the 24th of November, that troop horses should be sent down for forage to Balaklava. This I objected to, upon the grounds that the horses were totally unfit to march seven or eight miles (the distance as stated in the report of the commissioners) from the camp to Balaklava, and then return heavily laden with forage, without a greater loss of horses to the brigade and the service than that which occurred by the deficiency of forage.

The Commissariat-General never applied to me officially to send down troop horses, nor was any representation made to Lord Raglan by that department. It may here be observed, too, that the greater part of the correspondence by the Deputy-Assistant-Commissariat-General relative to the Light Cavalry Brigade was addressed to the Lieutenant-General commanding the division (vide pages 48 and 49 of the Commissioners' report).

I beg to add that no proposal was ever made to me to send down troop horses either by Colonel Douglas, Colonel de Salis, or any officer of the brigade; and I would here ask why Colonel Shewell, who in his evidence named me as the responsible person, did not, on the 18th of November, when the Lieutenant-General of the Cavalry Division gave a variety of orders to the commanding officers of regiments as to the details of the duties of the brigade, and when he (Colonel Shewell) personally asked for and obtained leave of absence to go on board ship—why he did not, if the case was so pressing, apply to the Lieutenant-General for permission to send the troop horses for forage? But this omission of profiting by such an opportunity on the part of Colonel Shewell, and the fact that no other commanding officer in the Light Brigade, when they were assembled to receive the Lieutenant-General on the 18th of November, made any similar suggestion, confirms my conviction that, whatever opinions those officers might have expressed in the month of March last before the commissioners, they all concurred with me in opinion in the month of November, 1854, that the troop horses were unfit to perform the duty of carrying the forage.

Another opportunity was afforded to the commanding officers of regiments on the 28th of November, 1854, of making any representation to the Lieutenant-General, in a general meeting of the troops, when an order was sent direct to them with regard to encampment, a copy of which is now transmitted.

With regard to Colonel Shewell's evidence, that officer states that, "if the horses had received their full rations they would not have suffered so much, notwithstanding their exposure to the weather," whereas it is notorious that the mortality among the horses in the Heavy Brigade, during the month of November, 1854, was greater than that of the light brigade, although they were so much better supplied with forage.

Reference is made by Colonel Shewell "to the deficiency of nosebags, in consequence of which the grain was laid on the ground, and a great part of it lost." I have to state that every endeavour was made by me to obtain nosebags for the brigade. Sir Edmund Lyons, to assist me, which was the cause of 400 nosebags being supplied to the Light Brigade by the kindness of the gallant Admiral.

I received the following letter on the subject from Sir Edmund Lyons:—

Her Majesty's ship Agamemnon, off Sebastopol, January 3, 1855.

My dear Lord,—At length the nosebags are made; but your Lordship is gone, and I think I am doing as you would wish in sending them to your successor in command of the Light Division.

I was sorry to hear that you had been obliged to leave this army—obliged certainly were; for no man fought against the effects of such campaigning as you, and against the enemy, more manfully than you. I send you, with the heat and privations on the Danube, the cold and exposure before Sebastopol, and the glorious charge before Balaklava.

I have, &c., EDMUND LYONS.

I will here state that I feel proud of the good opinion of so distinguished a man as Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.

Colonel Doherty gives similar evidence to that of Colonel Douglas before the commissioners, viz., that the horses only had an average of two pounds and a half of barley after the 12th of November, but which statement cannot be sustained against the evidence I have adduced to the contrary. He also states that 16 troop

horses fell dead although led, marching from one encampment to the other. Although this occurred four days after I had resigned the command of the brigade, I cannot but think that that number has been unintentionally exaggerated; but if otherwise, it only tends to prove that for any reasonable number of days previous the horses could not have been fit to go the distance, and carry the burdens I have already alluded to.

I have now to advert to a very important point—viz., that on the 16th of November I suggested to the officers commanding the regiments of the Light Brigade the necessity of their furnishing me with reports of the state of their regiments with regard to their men and horses, notifying all deficiencies and grievances which they might wish to represent, in order that I might transmit them through the Lieutenant-General commanding the division to Lord Raglan, knowing the hardships and inconveniences to which they were all exposed, and hoping that the Commander-in-Chief would order the brigade to be removed to a more convenient place of encampment.

I herewith transmit to your Lordship copies of the reports furnished by officers commanding regiments in the Light Brigade; and you will no doubt be surprised to see that scarcely any allusion is made to the state of the horses, and no suggestion whatever made as to the advisability of troop horses being sent for forage. Not having received, after the 16th of November, any acknowledgment of those reports, I addressed a letter to the Assistant-Adjutant-General, Lord William Paulet, to which I received a reply, an extract from which I now forward.

Camp near Sebastopol, November 18, 1854.

My dear Lord Cardigan,—I submitted your letter, and those of the five commanding officers, to Lord Raglan, who has been now in his possession, and I think, does not intend forwarding them for Lord Raglan's consideration.

I have, &c., W. PAULET.

To prove further my constant attention to the details of the brigade, I beg to transmit a letter which I addressed to the Lieutenant-General commanding the division on the 16th of November, 1854, relative to the state of the sick in the hospitals of the camp, in which (after making some slight complaints as to the details of duties of the brigade) I strongly urged that immediate means might be adopted for them to be sent on board ship. In a quadruple of cases, a long delay occurred, in consequence, no doubt, upon the unavoidable absence of the means of transport.

I have only further to add that, taking advantage of the private friendship with which Lord Raglan honoured me, I several times urged upon his Lordship the benefit that would be derived by removing the Light Cavalry Brigade to a more convenient encampment; and the brigade was removed near the valley near Balaklava, on the 3rd of December, four days after I had resigned the command of it, Colonel Doherty having been instantly on my resignation put in orders as my successor in command of the Light Cavalry Brigade.

Having thus, my Lord, given a plain statement of all which occurred during the last days of my command of the Light Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, and stating that in consequence of the report of the Commissioners, a great deal of inquiry has been heaped upon me, and my military character has been severely and unparagonably reflected upon, I must beg leave, in a few words, to state what my humble services were while serving with the army of the East, and the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army as to the manner in which I performed the duties which devolved upon me. On the 24th of June, 1854, I received the following orders:—

Head-quarters, Varna, June 24, 1854, 11 p.m.

The Earl of Cardigan will proceed in person early to-morrow, the 25th of June, to Balaklava, carrying with him three days' provisions and forage, take with him thence the whole of the Turkish cavalry stationed there, and proceed with the least possible delay towards Kara-su in order to ascertain the movements of the enemy."

Forage and provisions will be sent for his party, including the Turkish cavalry, hence to Balaklava by the direct route early to-morrow

211, George-street, on THURSDAY, 5th June,
1861.
Terms at sale.

